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Improving health outcomes 
There is strong international support for increasing government expenditures and
donor funding to accelerate progress toward the Millennium Development Goals.
Additional government health expenditures and donor funding, although they may
improve health outcomes, in particular maternal mortality and mortality of children
under ﬁve, are not likely to be sufﬁcient to reach the Millennium Development Goals
for health by 2015. Reaching these goals requires broad economic growth and invest-
ment, signiﬁcant change in the way donor funding is provided, and more efﬁcient
health spending.
With so many countries not on track to meet the health-related Millennium
Development Goals, the international community is now reaching a consensus
that current health expenditure levels in developing countries are too low and that
more resources are needed (see chapter 7). These discussions take for granted,
however, that the additional expenditures and resources will bring about the
desired health outcomes. The discussions also often ignore the additional actions
required to improve the ability of countries to absorb and mobilize additional
resources to reach the Millennium Development Goals.
This chapter contains new ﬁndings on the impact of government health expen-
ditures and donor funding on health outcomes. These ﬁndings indicate that gov-
ernment health expenditures do indeed affect under-ﬁve mortality and maternal
mortality, contrary to results reported in much of the literature to date. The
results also show that donor funding has a direct impact on under-ﬁve mortality,
but not on maternal mortality. Nonetheless, donor funding indirectly affects
maternal mortality by increasing the impact of governmental health expenditures
on this outcome.
These effects of donor funding on health outcomes can be explained in part by the
volatility and fungibility of donor funding, as well as by the difﬁculties that govern-
ments face in reallocating resources in the short term after a donor has decreased or
discontinued funding. This chapter reviews these effects and their implications for
reaching the Millennium Development Goals for child mortality and maternal mor-
tality across different regions. The chapter concludes by addressing the fundamental
issues for improving countries’ chances of reaching the Millennium Development
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Goals for health. These issues include stimulating economic growth and multisec-
toral investment, as well as changing the way donor funding is provided and gov-
ernment health expenditures are used, so that these critical resources produce
better health outcomes. Three key lessons emerge from the discussion:
• Neither increased government health expenditures nor GDP growth alone are
sufﬁcient for reaching the health Millennium Development Goals. Although
both expenditures and growth affect health outcomes, long-term investments
in infrastructure, education, and water and sanitation are also needed. Further-
more, GDP growth is essential not only because it generates greater personal
income, which directly boosts health outcomes, but also because it generates
government revenues that can support a multisectoral approach to health
investments.
• Recipient countries must improve their capacity to absorb and use additional
health resources by strengthening policies and institutions for managing pub-
lic expenditures. Resources, even if available, must be made accessible regu-
larly and on time where health services are to be delivered; this effort requires
efﬁcient public expenditure management from central to local government
and from local government to the service facility. It also implies appropriate
accountability at all levels of government. (Such accountability is further
reviewed in chapter 6.)
• Donors must carefully evaluate their role and desired impact in country-speciﬁc
contexts to improve the consistency between donor and country objectives.
Donor aid now has a limited direct impact on health outcomes, in part because
of the fungibility, volatility, and asymmetry in budgeting (see chapter 4).1 To
improve outcomes, donors must
✧ Exercise care in designing aid programs and evaluating the impact of their
funds.
✧ Give serious consideration to supporting government budgets directly
through general budget support. Donors should agree with governments on
a program, rather than directly ﬁnance projects that may crowd out the gov-
ernment’s own resources.
✧ Commit to predictable ﬁnancing over long maturities to provide budget
support to existing government programs. This action is especially impor-
tant given the recurrent nature of many health expenditures, which make
them unsuitable for ﬁnancing through short-term grants.
✧ Directly fund projects only in cases of major government failure, especially
in public expenditure management.
✧ Provide technical assistance as the ﬁrst priority in cases of government fail-
ure to improve public expenditure management and government capacity.
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Government health expenditures 
The theoretical link between increases in government health expenditures and
improved health outcomes is complex for several reasons. First, an increase in
government health expenditures may result in a decrease in private health
expenditures—a household may divert its funds to other uses once the govern-
ment increases its basic health expenditures. Second, incremental government
expenditures may be employed ineffectively (for instance, expenditures allocated
to high-tech equipment or advanced hospitals may have little effect on public
health if morbidity indicators show the need for increased resources for primary
care). Third, even if extra funds are applied appropriately, they may yield little
beneﬁt if complementary services, both inside and outside the health sector, are
lacking (for example, roads or transportation services to hospitals and clinics and
easy access to water and sanitation) (Wagstaff 2002a).
The empirical literature has not shed much light on the link between public
spending and health outcomes. Early studies (as summarized by Musgrove in
1996) ﬁnd no evidence that total spending on health has any impact on child
mortality. Filmer and Pritchett (1999) ﬁnd that government health expenditures
account for less than one-seventh of one percent of the variation in under-ﬁve
mortality across countries, although the result was not statistically signiﬁcant.
They conclude that 95 percent of the variation in under-ﬁve mortality can be
explained by factors such as the country’s per capita income, female educational
attainment, and choice of religion. Finally, using a model similar to that of Filmer
and Pritchett, Wagstaff and Claeson (2004) showed more recently that good poli-
cies and institutions (as measured by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Insti-
tutional Assessment or CPIA Index) are important determinants of the impact of
government health expenditures on outcomes. In particular, as the quality of poli-
cies and institutions improves (as the CPIA Index rises), the impact of govern-
ment health expenditures on maternal mortality, underweight children under age
ﬁve, and tuberculosis mortality also increases and is statistically signiﬁcant. How-
ever, the impact of government expenditures on under-ﬁve mortality remains not
signiﬁcantly different from zero.
New ﬁndings on the impact of government and donor funding 
As discussed above, a large percentage of donor assistance for health is managed
directly by the donor outside the recipient government’s budgeting system—it is
off-budget. A model developed for this report2 attempts to capture both the direct
and indirect impact of these off-budget resources on health outcomes. Donor
funding levels and the volatility of donor funding are included in the model as
explanatory variables.3 In addition, the critical relationship and interaction
between donor funding and public health spending is also taken into account to
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capture the impact of the fungibility of aid with respect to domestically ﬁnanced
public spending.4
The impact of government health expenditure is of key interest. In contrast to
other results presented in the literature, this study found that a 10 percent increase
in government health expenditures has a larger net impact5 in reducing under-ﬁve
mortality and maternal mortality than a 10 percent increase in education, roads,
or sanitation. Government health expenditures also have as large an impact as
income on under-ﬁve mortality but a smaller impact on maternal mortality.6 In
addition, for a 10 percent increase in government health expenditures, the
decrease in maternal mortality is typically 1 percentage point more than the
decrease in under-ﬁve mortality. In Albania, for example, a 10 percent increase in
government health expenditures (from the current observed value of 92 Int$ per
capita to 101.2 Int$) implies a 4.1 percent reduction in under-ﬁve mortality and a
5.5 percent reduction in maternal mortality.7 In absolute terms, this would reduce
under-ﬁve mortality from 26 per 1,000 to 24.8 per 1,000 and maternal mortality
from 55 per 100,000 to 52 per 100,000.
Another important ﬁnding concerns the effect of donor funding on health-
related outcomes. Donor funding can make an important dent in under-ﬁve
mortality—but only when it is predictable and sustained. In contrast, neither the
amount nor the volatility of donor funding has a direct impact on maternal mor-
tality.8 Donor funding does have an indirect impact on maternal mortality, how-
ever, through its impact on government expenditures. This likely arises from the
fungibility of donor funding. If the recipient country takes these external and
largely off-budget funds into consideration in the allocation of its own domestic
resources and spends more of its own money on, say, secondary care such as hos-
pitals, which typically are not funded by donors, the increased and sustained
expenditure on secondary care may increase the effect of government expendi-
tures on maternal mortality. Table 5.1 shows the regression results for under-ﬁve
mortality and maternal mortality.9
Reaching the Millennium Development Goals for health
Will the Millennium Development Goals, at least for under-ﬁve mortality and
maternal mortality, be reached? What are the implications for policy develop-
ment? Several conclusions can be drawn from this model and other work in the
literature.10
Continuing current levels of ﬁnancing and growth and lack of coordination
across sectors—“business as usual”—would mean that none of the developing
regions of the world, according to the World Bank’s regional classiﬁcations, will
reach the Millennium Development Goal for under-ﬁve mortality (ﬁgure 5.1).
Moreover, the slow progress from 1990 to 2000 implies that, to reach the under-ﬁve
mortality goal in 2015, the annual rate of decline in mortality would have to be
larger than the average 4.2 percent needed originally (as represented by the target
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bar on the ﬁgure).11 For example, in East Asia and Paciﬁc, under-ﬁve mortality
would have to decline at a new rate of about 5 percent a year from 2001 to 2015
(black square on ﬁgure 5.1), almost double the current rate of 2.7 percent, as aver-
aged over the period 1990–2000 and represented by the top shaded area. In the case
of Sub-Saharan Africa, the rate of decline in under-ﬁve mortality has to accelerate
from less than 0.5 percent a year between 1990 and 2000 to close to 8 percent a year
between 2001 and 2015 to reach the Millennium Development Goal.
The outlook is more optimistic for maternal mortality (ﬁgure 5.2). Nonethe-
less, the business-as-usual trend will not be sufﬁcient to reach the Millennium
Development Goal, except in the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia and
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TABLE 5.1 Model regression results for under-ﬁve mortality 
and maternal mortality
Variable Under-ﬁve mortality Maternal mortality
intercept 8.2591++ 9.9084++
(0.08477) (1.4544)
lnE 0.0651 0.3082++
(0.0427) (0.0863)
lnR –0.0868++ –0.1019++
(0.0241) (0.0415)
lnS 0.0493 0.1708
(0.1115) (0.1533)
lnVol 0.096++ 0.0604
(0.029) (0.0408)
lnGDP –0.3689++ –0.5320+
(0.1348) (0.2477)
lnGh –0.3708++ –0.4286+
(0.1082) (0.2026)
lnDF –0.0429+ –0.0348
(0.0233) (0.0367)
lnGh*DF –0.0122 –0.0340+
(0.01) (0.0175)
R2 0.8216 0.7414
Adjusted R2 0.8079 0.7215
Source: World Bank staff estimates.
Note: Parameter standard errors are given in parenthesis. Estimates are based on the regression model presented in 
annex 5.1.
E = education, R = roads, S = sanitation, Vol = volatility of donor funding, GDP = gross domestic product per capita, 
Gh = government health expenditure, DF = donor funding.
++ p-value = 0.01 or less; + p-value = 0.05 or less
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Paciﬁc regions. The annual rates of decline in maternal mortality will have to
change in South Asia from about 3 percent in the 1990s to about 7 percent in 2000
to 2015 and in Europe and Central Asia from about 4 percent to 6 percent. The
rate of decline in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean would
have to change from less than 2 percent a year to close to 8 percent. For Latin
America and the Caribbean, this steep target may be partially due to the low base-
line maternal mortality ratio in the region in 1990. The difﬁculty that the region is
likely to have in reaching this target suggests that returns to delivery of appropri-
ate services to reduce maternal mortality for the most marginalized women are
diminishing. Efforts must be made to extend health services to remote areas and
target the groups that are hardest to reach.
A multisectoral effort needed
Reaching the Millennium Development Goals requires a multisectoral effort plus
growth in real GDP per capita. For most developing countries, anything short of
this combined effort raises the likelihood that the goals will not be reached. For
example, India has enjoyed an impressive real GDP per capita growth of 3.8 per-
cent a year over the past four years. However, the model simulations show that
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FIGURE 5.1 Progress toward reducing under-ﬁve mortality, by region
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the model presented in annex 5.1.
Note: Extrasectoral contributions include contributions from the variables for income, education, roads, sanitation, and
donor funding. Those contributions, as well as government health expenditure, are assumed to grow at 2.5 percent annually.
Volatility of donor funding is assumed to be decreasing at 2.5 percent (by the end of 2015 donor funding will be one-third less
volatile). Regional averages are population weighted.
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even this impressive growth of income will fall short of the 15 percent increase in
real GDP per capita needed over the period 2000 to 2015 if the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals are to be reached through growth alone.
Similarly, resources devoted to health expenditures are insufﬁcient by them-
selves to reach the goals. For instance, in Rwanda, per capita public expenditures
would have to increase from $3.1 a year in 2004 to more than $56 in constant 2000
dollars by 2015. With no growth, the country would be spending more on health
than the government collects in total revenues. A multisectoral approach with
investments in infrastructure, education, and health is needed. Growth must
occur, not only because of the direct impact of income on outcomes, but also
because the ﬁnancing of the multisectoral approach requires such growth and the
revenues that it generates.
The combination of increasing health expenditures and growth would most
likely help low-income countries come closer to reaching the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals related to maternal and child mortality, but for a few countries
even this formula would not work (ﬁgure 5.3). Kenya, Rwanda, and Sudan, for
example, would not reach the under-ﬁve mortality goal even with ambitious
increases in real per capita growth rates of 5 percent a year (above an average of
–1.1 percent, 3.3 percent, and 3.9 percent, respectively, over the past four years)
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FIGURE 5.2 Progress toward reducing maternal mortality, by region
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the model presented in annex 5.1.
Note: Extrasectoral contributions include contributions from the variables for income, education, roads, sanitation, and
donor funding. Those contributions, as well as government health expenditure, are assumed to grow at 2.5 percent annually.
Volatility of donor funding is assumed to be decreasing at 2.5 percent (by the end of 2015, donor funding will be one-third less
volatile). Regional averages are population weighted.
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and increases of 5 percent a year in government health spending and the other
explanatory variables of the model (education, roads, sanitation, and donor fund-
ing). According to the model, it would take very optimistic increases of 7 percent
a year in real GDP per capita and government health expenditures, along with
5 percent annual increases in all the other variables, for these countries to reach
the goal. To reach the Millennium Development Goal for maternal mortality by
2015, these countries would require similarly optimistic growth in GDP per capita
and public expenditures.
Countries that strive to meet the Millennium Development Goals on health
through a multisector and growth approach will have to emphasize not only
increasing investments in sectors that directly promote improved health out-
comes, but also pursue efforts that inﬂuence growth rates. Recent World Bank
work in this area suggests that those efforts involve trade, infrastructure, and the
policies and institutions required for attracting investment, such as mechanisms
for the protection of property rights and reliable judicial systems (Leipziger and
others 2003; Paternostro, Rajaram, and Tiongson 2004; Herrera and Pan 2005).
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FIGURE 5.3 Under-ﬁve mortality targets and projected rates in Kenya, Rwanda, and Sudan
Source: World Bank staff estimates based on the model presented in annex 5.1.
Note: Projections for all three countries assume a positive 5 percent change per year in government health expenditures,
education, infrastructure, water supply and sanitation, and donor funding. The solid line below the dotted line for Rwanda
implies that under-ﬁve mortality in 1990 was below the 2000 estimate.
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Donors and predictable resources
The model described in annex 5.1 shows that there is no direct impact of donor
ﬁnancing on maternal mortality ratios. Rather, the impact on maternal mortality
occurs indirectly, by permitting an increase in the levels and sustainability of gov-
ernment health expenditures. Similarly, erratic donor ﬁnancing does not have an
impact on under-ﬁve mortality.
These results may be explained by the volatility and fungibility of donor fund-
ing, as well as by the difﬁculties governments have in reallocating resources from
one priority to another. This implies that donors should not try to second guess
recipient countries’ priorities. Faster progress can be made by ﬁnancing govern-
ment programs, such as poverty reduction strategies, as the ﬁrst priority. These
programs must also be multisectoral, have appropriate growth strategies, and
include efforts to improve policies and institutions. Donor funding must be pre-
dictable, stable, and sustained over a long period.
Improving policies and institutions
Wagstaff and Claeson (2004) have recently shown that policies and institutions are
important for increases in spending to have a signiﬁcant effect on health outcomes
in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The work shows that the impact
of government health expenditures on outcomes is directly related to each coun-
try’s policies and institutions, as reﬂected in the World Bank’s measured assessment
of country policies and institutions, the CPIA Index (see chapter 6). The authors
conclude that increases in government health expenditures would not have an
impact on any Millennium Development Goal outcome in countries with a CPIA
below or at 3.25 (scale 1 through 5). Business as usual will not be sufﬁcient in such
countries. To reach the Millennium Development Goals, strong policy and institu-
tional efforts are fundamental. These efforts include concentration on technical
assistance to improve public expenditure management, administrative capacity,
monitoring and evaluation, and mechanisms for ensuring accountability.
Improving health outcomes 169
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Annex 5.1 Government health expenditures, donor funding,
and health outcomes: data and methods
The discussion in chapter 5 is based, in part, on the estimates of the following
reduced form equation:
(1)
where Ym is either under-ﬁve mortality or maternal mortality.
12 The functional
form is based on the assumption that these health outcomes are a function of gov-
ernment health expenditures (Gh), national income (I), education (E), roads (R)
and sanitation (S) as well as the level of off-budget donor funding (DF) and
volatility in donor funding (V). The percentage change in under-ﬁve mortality (or
maternal mortality) due to a percentage change in government health expendi-
tures (Gh), can be estimated from equation (1) as βm7+βm8lnDF. It should be
noted that a small change in government health expenditures may be associated
with a direct change in under-ﬁve mortality (or maternal mortality) as well as a
change in other Millennium Development Goal health indicators such as propor-
tion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles and proportion of popula-
tion in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention. Furthermore, any
change in these latter indicators (which are not included in the right-hand side of
the equation) would also cause a change in, for instance, under-ﬁve mortality. Thus
our elasticity measure gives the net percentage change in indicator Ym associated
with a 1 percent change in Gh, holding I, E, R, S, DF, and V, but not the other Millen-
nium Development Goals for Health indicators, constant. Finally, note that income
and government health expenditures may both be correlated with the error term. We
account for potential endogeneity of these variables through the use of instrumental
variables within the generalized method of moments estimation techniques.
Data sources and description
Data on these variables were obtained from various sources and linked for 113
countries for the calender year 2000. The primary source was the World Bank’s in-
house online database, SIMA, which is a collection of variables from various data
sources including World Development Indicators, Millennium Indicators Data-
base, World Health Report, and Human Development Report by the United
Nations Children’s Fund.
Under-ﬁve mortality is measured as the under-ﬁve mortality rate per 1,000 live
births and maternal mortality is measured as the maternal mortality ratio per
100,000 live births. The measure of national income is GDP per capita;13 education
ln ln ln ln ln
ln
Y E R S DFm m m m m m
m
= + + + +
+
β β β β β
β
1 2 3 4 5
6 I Gh DF Gh V vm m m m+ + + +β β β7 8 9ln ln ln
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is the percentage of the population age 15 or older who are illiterate; sanitation is
the percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation facilities;
and the measure for roads is paved roads (in kilometers) per unit area of country
(in square kilometers). Data on government health expenditures are also in per
capita terms and data for 2000 were obtained using the World Health Organiza-
tion’s World Health Report 2004.
Information on donor funding was obtained from the Creditor Reporting Sys-
tem table of the International Development Statistics online database. Funding
commitments came from the Development Assistance Committee countries of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. These donations are
bilateral and are usually used for speciﬁc off-budget health projects. Because bilat-
eral donations are not counted as part of a country’s government health budget,
this variable was used as a measure of donor funding. However, this is the amount
that the receiving countries were promised by donor countries in the given calen-
dar year, not the actual amount received. The actual amount received is with a lag
of a few years and may be different from the amount promised. For this reason the
lagged value of the variable was used. For example, for the 2000 analysis the donor
funding variable is per capita donor funding from Development Assistance Com-
mittee countries for health promised in 1998. For volatility, the standard deviation
of the donor funding variable between 1994 and 1998 was used. Summary statistics
of the log of these variables as used in the model are provided in table A5.1.
Endogeneity and instruments
Although many of the conditions of poverty—lack of clean water, sanitation,
access to health services, and education—can lead to high levels of illness, micro
theory suggests a reverse causality as well. Speciﬁcally, morbidity and ill health of
the individuals in a family affects their ability to work and hence their income and
can cause the household to fall into poverty. Similarly, it is possible that the gov-
ernment health expenditures variable may be correlated with the error term
because governments may implicitly respond to poor health outcomes in prior
years by adjusting health care spending in the current year. Here the source of
endogeneity is not, per se, reverse causality—government budgets are set at the
beginning of a year (with perhaps some deviations by the end of the year) while
the health indicators are measured at the end of year—but rather due to omitted
variables bias. Speciﬁcally, if current health outcomes are correlated with past
health outcomes, and if the current government health expenditure is implicitly a
function of prior health outcomes, equation (1) is misspeciﬁed to the extent that
past health outcomes are not included in the equation.
To correct for potential endogeneity of income and government health expen-
ditures, we estimate the models using instrumental variables techniques. The
instrument that we use for national income is the consumption-investment ratio
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TABLE A5.1 Variable names and summary statistics
Standard
Variable Deﬁnition (N = 113) Mean Minimuma Maximum deviation Median
lnU5M ln under-ﬁve mortality per 
1,000 live births 3.9892 1.3863 5.656 1.0009 3.912
lnMM ln maternal mortality per 100,000 
live births 5.1603 0 7.6009 1.4905 5.0752
lnGDP ln GDP per capitab 8.0187 6.1527 10.2681 0.9317 8.1634
lnGH ln government health 
expenditures per capitab 4.2694 1.3863 7.688 1.2735 4.4188
lnE ln education (percent of 
population age 15 or older 
illiterate) 2.4028 –2.3026 4.4313 1.5535 2.7535
lnS ln sanitation (percent of 
population with access to 
improved sanitation) 4.1493 2.0794 4.6052 0.5381 4.3567
lnR ln roads (paved roads per 
unit area) 1.3805 –8.8307 6.2198 2.3687 1.5023
lnDF ln donor funding per capita for 
basic health in 1998b –0.4775 –8.3192 4.1263 2.702 0.2836
lvol ln standard deviation of donor 
commitment from 1994 to 1998 –0.0487 –9.1084 3.3009 2.251 0.4741
lnGH*DF (lnGH – lnGH) × (DF – DF) –1.1532 –34.0156 17.3859 5.2929 –0.6972
Source: Authors.
a. Log of zero was set equal to zero if the nonzero values were greater than one. However, if nonzero values were less than
one, the log of zero was set equal to the log of the nonzero minimum value.
b. Converted to constant 2000 international dollars.
of the country because it is likely to be correlated with the GDP variable but not
with under-ﬁve mortality or maternal mortality. Similarly, the instrument that we
use for government health expenditures (and their interaction with donor fund-
ing) is military expenditures of neighboring countries (and their interaction with
donor funding).
In addition to these variables, two other instruments were used. The World
Bank staff annually assesses (and scores) the quality of polices and institutions in 4
broad areas with 20 criteria relevant to economic growth and poverty reduction of
the countries borrowing from the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and from the International Development Association.14 Of these 20
criteria, 4 score the countries on a scale of 1–5 or 1–6 on the following issues relat-
ing to economic management: management of inﬂation and currency accounting,
ﬁscal policy, management of external debt, and management and sustainability of
developmental programs. The average score on these four criteria was used as an
additional instrument for GDP per capita. Similarly, scores on three additional cri-
teria partly assess the policies for social inclusion and equity: gender equity, equity
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of public resource use, and policies for building human resources. The average
score on these three criteria was used as an additional instrument for government
health expenditures.
Results
For each of the two indicators (under-ﬁve mortality and maternal mortality),
equation (1) was estimated under a set of alternative assumptions about the
error term: (a) no correlation between any of the right-hand side variables and
the error terms (no endogeneity), (b) the government health expenditures vari-
able and its interaction with the donor funding variable are correlated with the
error term but the income variable is not correlated with the error term (only
lnGh and lnGh × DF are endogenous), and (c) the income variable is also corre-
lated with the error term (lnGh, lnGh × DF and lnI are all endogenous variables).
Furthermore, for each of the three assumptions above, the equations were esti-
mated with and without accounting for the presence of an unknown form of het-
eroscedasticity. Thus under assumption (a) we estimated ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimates with the usual standard errors as well as the heteroscedastic
ordinary least squares (HOLS). Similarly, under assumptions (b) and (c), stan-
dard two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates as well as the Davidson and Mack-
innon’s general method of moments heteroscedastic two-stage least squares
(GMM-H2SLS) estimator was used to compute the estimates and the standard
errors. Graphical methods indicate that mild heteroscedasticity is present. More
formal White tests based on the interaction of all terms yield chi-square statistics
that are signiﬁcant in the p=.10 to p=.15 range. Results for the two indicators
(under-ﬁve mortality and maternal mortality) are summarized in table A5.2. The
six columns in the table correspond to estimates based on assumptions (a), (b),
and (c) with and without heteroscedasticity.
Weak instruments, Hausman, and overidentiﬁcation tests
The reliability of the instrumental variables estimates (2SLS and GMM-H2SLS)
relies on the use of good instruments. To establish the empirical relevance of these
instruments, the weak instruments test was performed. In all “ﬁrst-stage” regres-
sions, the joint F-test for the additional instruments alone was almost always
above the rule-of-thumb recommended value of 10 (test statistics are given near
the bottom of table A5.2).
Additionally, the validity of the instruments (under heteroscedasticity) was
tested through the usual overidentiﬁcation tests. Thus for speciﬁcation (VI) for
under-ﬁve mortality and maternal mortality, the maintained null that the instru-
ments are valid could not be rejected at the usual levels (for under-ﬁve mortality,
the Hansen’s J-statistic was 0.331, with a p-value of 0.954, and for maternal mor-
tality, the test statistic was 3.806, with a p-value of 0.283).
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TABLE A5.2 Regression results
GH exogenous GH endogenous GH endogenous
and GDP exogenous and GDP exogenous and GDP endogenous
OLS (I) H-OLS (II) 2SLS (III) H2SLS (IV) 2SLS (V) GMM-H2SLS (VI)
Dependent variable: log of under-ﬁve mortality
Intercept 7.9642++ 8.2199++ 7.0014++ 7.4697++ 8.0852++ 8.2591++
(0.6425) (0.5516) (0.9122) (0.7742) (1.0634) (0.08477)
lnE 0.1158++ 0.1203++ 0.0795+ 0.1005++ 0.0614 0.0651
(0.034) (0.0331) (0.0406) (0.038) (0.0417) (0.0427)
lnR –0.1088++ –0.1015++ –0.0986++ –0.0773++ –0.089++ –0.0868++
(0.0201) (0.0196) (0.0206) (0.0233) (0.0216) (0.0241)
lnS –0.0379 –0.1238 –0.0081 –0.0595 0.0562 0.0493
(0.0935) (0.081) (0.0948) (0.093) (0.1031) (0.1115)
lnV 0.0896++ 0.1051++ 0.1047++ 0.1106++ 0.0981++ 0.096++
(0.0267) (0.0258) (0.0282) (0.029) (0.0289) (0.029)
lnGDP –0.4036++ –0.3902++ –0.1666 –0.2422+ –0.3395 –0.3689++
(0.1004) (0.0764) (0.1812) (0.129) (0.1966) (0.1348)
lnGH –0.1684+ –0.1726‡ –0.4003‡ –0.3405‡ –0.3886++ –0.3708++
(0.0793) (0.07) (0.1574) (0.1204) (0.1495) (0.1082)
lnDF –0.0218 –0.0312 –0.0314 –0.0387 –0.0416+ –0.0429+
(0.0224) (0.0223) (0.023) (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0233)
lnGH × DFa –0.0027 –0.0063 –0.0016 –0.0081 –0.011 –0.0122
(0.0082) (0.0061) (0.0109) (0.0081) (0.0119) (0.01)
R2 0.8315 0.8286 0.8176 0.8208 0.8077 0.8079
Dependent variable: log of maternal mortality
Intercept 8.5353++ 8.2238++ 7.0755++ 6.8036++ 9.8304++ 9.9084++
(1.1557) (0.884) (1.6184) (1.3032) (1.9175) (1.4544)
lnE 0.3968++ 0.4467++ 0.3442++ 0.394++ 0.307++ 0.3082++
(0.0612) (0.0593) (0.072) (0.0752) (0.0751) (0.0863)
lnR –0.1273++ –0.1241++ –0.1157++ –0.1085++ –0.093‡ –0.1019++
(0.0362) (0.0354) (0.0365) (0.0414) (0.039) (0.0415)
lnS –0.0615 –0.0545 –0.0201 0.0209 0.1284 0.1708
(0.1682) (0.1249) (0.1682) (0.1462) (0.1859) (0.1533)
lnV 0.0641 0.0508 0.0861 0.0907‡ 0.0679 0.0604
(0.048) (0.0391) (0.0501) (0.0438) (0.0521) (0.0408)
lnGDP –0.3664‡ –0.3944++ –0.0161 –0.0398 –0.4675 –0.532‡
(0.1805) (0.1312) (0.3215) (0.2533) (0.3545) (0.2477)
(Continues)
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Finally, the Hausman statistic was employed to test for endogeneity of variables
under assumptions (b) and (c) above. For 5 of 6 tests, the null hypothesis of no endo-
geneity was rejected.15 The Hausman test statistics (under heteroscedasticity) are sum-
marized in table A5.3. The conclusions of the Hausman test results were identical
when homoscedastic errors were assumed. (These gave six additional test statistics that
are not given in table A5.3.) On the basis of the remaining ﬁve tests, Gh (and its inter-
action with DF) as well as the income variable are treated as endogenous variables.
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TABLE A5.3 Hausman X 2-statistics (with heteroscedastic error terms)
For under-ﬁve mortality equation
II vs IV 5.1709 (Pr X2 (2) 4.61) 0.1, hence can reject Null (at 10 percent)
II vs VI 9.0995 (Pr(X2 (3) 7.81) 0.05, hence can reject Null
IV vs VI 16.05 (Pr (X2 (1) 3.84) 0.05, hence can reject Null
For maternal mortality equation
II vs IV 4.2918 (Pr X2 (2) 4.61) 0.1, hence cannot reject Null
II vs VI 12.9342 (Pr(X2 (3) 7.81) 0.05, hence can reject Null
IV vs VI 3.8282 (Pr(X2(1) 2.71) 0.1, hence can reject Null (at 10 percent)
TABLE A5.2 Regression results (Continued)
GH exogenous GH endogenous GH endogenous 
and GDP exogenous and GDP exogenous and GDP endogenous
OLS (I) H-OLS (II) 2SLS (III) H2SLS (IV) 2SLS (V) GMM-H2SLS (VI)
Dependent variable: log of maternal mortality (Continued)
lnGH –0.2306 –0.1333 –0.5604‡ –0.5225‡ –0.498+ –0.4286‡
(0.1426) (0.1022) (0.2792) (0.2273) (0.2696) (0.2026)
lnDF –0.0177 0.0108 –0.0312 –0.0283 –0.054 –0.0348
(0.0403) (0.0361) (0.0409) (0.0394) (0.0436) (0.0367)
lnGH × DFa –0.017 –0.0155 –0.0103 –0.0106 –0.0352+ –0.034+
(0.0147) (0.0112) (0.0193) (0.0161) (0.0215) (0.0175)
R2 0.7541 0.7502 0.7411 0.742 0.718 0.7215
First-stage statistics (for III and IV) First-stage statistics (for V and VI)
Dependent variable lnGH lnGH × DFa lnGH lnGH × DFa lnGDP
R2 0.691 0.7357 0.7166 0.7377 0.6837
Overall F-statistic 25.59 31.85 23.21 25.82 19.85
Weak instruments 
F-test 11.48 63.96 9.7 42.27 12.36
Source:
Note: Parameter standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
a. The variable used in the regression was (lnGH – LnGH) * (DF – DF), where x¯ stands for the mean value of the variable.
++ p-value = 0.01 or less; + p-value = 0.05 or less; ‡ p-value = 0.1 or less
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Elasticities
Given the results of the test statistics above, we use the coefﬁcients in the last col-
umn of table A5.2 as the “correct” coefﬁcients.
The coefﬁcients on the education and roads variables have the correct sign, but
for under-ﬁve mortality the coefﬁcient for education in speciﬁcation (VI) is no
longer statistically signiﬁcant. A 10 percent reduction in illiteracy reduces under-
ﬁve mortality by 0.65 percent and maternal mortality by 3.1 percent. Similarly, a
10 percent increase in the network of paved roads per unit area of the country
reduces under-ﬁve mortality by about 0.87 percent and maternal mortality by
about 1 percent. Note that the OLS coefﬁcients biased these results away from
zero, thus exaggerating their impact on these two Millennium Development Goal
outcomes. Nonetheless, these are large effects. By contrast, the sign on the sanita-
tion variable is expected to be negative and signiﬁcant for both the indicators.
However the coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant in any of the estimations. A similar
result (of nonsigniﬁcance) was observed elsewhere as well. Although it is certainly
possible that sanitation, as deﬁned here, has no impact on the health outcomes,
this result is suspect. It is more likely that this variable is measured with error and
hence the lack of signiﬁcance may be due to attenuation bias.
Elasticity for per capita income is –0.3689 for under-ﬁve mortality and –0.532
for maternal mortality, and both are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
The coefﬁcient on Gh is negative and signiﬁcant for both under-ﬁve mortality
and maternal mortality and increases in magnitude when the instrumental variable
methods are used. The best point estimates of the coefﬁcients on Gh are –0.37 for
under-ﬁve mortality and –0.43 for maternal mortality. Due to the interaction with
DF the elasticity estimates range from –0.33 (country with lowest donor funding) to
–0.55 (country with highest donor funding) with a mean value of –0.37 for under-
ﬁve mortality. For maternal mortality the elasticity ranges from –0.31 (country with
lowest donor funding) to –0.93 (again country with highest donor funding) with a
mean value of –0.43. Country-speciﬁc elasticities are give in table A5.4.
Elasticity for donor funding is negative and signiﬁcant for under-ﬁve mortality
but is not statistically signiﬁcant for maternal mortality. This is likely because the
off-budget bilateral funds are usually set aside for primary care, not secondary
care projects.
Note that the elasticity of maternal mortality with respect to Gh is greater in
magnitude than the elasticity of under-ﬁve mortality for countries that are
above the mean value of donor funding. However, for countries that are at or
below the mean value of donor funding the difference in the elasticity of mater-
nal mortality and under-ﬁve mortality with respect to Gh is very small (in some
cases the elasticity of under-ﬁve mortality is larger than the elasticity of mater-
nal mortality). The fact that elasticity for Gh increases in magnitude with donor
funding is because of the negative sign on the interaction term between Gh and DF,
which in the case of maternal mortality is also signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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TABLE A5.4 Elasticity of under-ﬁve mortality and maternal mortality for 
government health expenditures
Under-ﬁve Standard Maternal Standard
mortality error t-value p-value mortality error t-value p-value
Albania –0.414 0.1056 –3.9224 0.0002 –0.5494 0.1905 –2.8845 0.0048
Algeria –0.3308 0.1204 –2.7483 0.0071 –0.3171 0.2286 –1.3869 0.1684
Argentina –0.3305 0.1205 –2.7427 0.0072 –0.3162 0.2289 –1.3814 0.1701
Armenia –0.3765 0.1071 –3.5142 0.0007 –0.4447 0.1999 –2.2247 0.0283
Azerbaijan –0.3326 0.1196 –2.78 0.0065 –0.3221 0.2272 –1.4178 0.1592
Bangladesh –0.3373 0.1178 –2.8617 0.0051 –0.3351 0.2236 –1.4986 0.137
Belarus –0.3324 0.1197 –2.7763 0.0065 –0.3216 0.2274 –1.4142 0.1603
Belize –0.33 0.1207 –2.734 0.0074 –0.3148 0.2293 –1.373 0.1727
Benin –0.4387 0.1094 –4.0103 0.0001 –0.6182 0.1924 –3.2128 0.0018
Bolivia –0.421 0.1063 –3.9623 0.0001 –0.569 0.1904 –2.9889 0.0035
Botswana –0.3338 0.1192 –2.8017 0.0061 –0.3256 0.2262 –1.4391 0.1531
Brazil –0.3302 0.1206 –2.7388 0.0073 –0.3156 0.2291 –1.3776 0.1713
Bulgaria –0.3302 0.1206 –2.7387 0.0073 –0.3156 0.2291 –1.3776 0.1713
Burkina Faso –0.3513 0.1131 –3.1073 0.0024 –0.3744 0.2137 –1.7518 0.0827
Burundi –0.352 0.1129 –3.1189 0.0023 –0.3763 0.2133 –1.7642 0.0806
Cambodia –0.382 0.1063 –3.5925 0.0005 –0.4601 0.1976 –2.3284 0.0218
Cameroon –0.3537 0.1124 –3.1473 0.0022 –0.3809 0.2122 –1.7948 0.0756
Cape Verde –0.389 0.1056 –3.6836 0.0004 –0.4796 0.1952 –2.4576 0.0156
Chad –0.3805 0.1065 –3.5709 0.0005 –0.4558 0.1982 –2.2992 0.0235
Chile –0.3302 0.1206 –2.7384 0.0073 –0.3155 0.2291 –1.3772 0.1714
China –0.3306 0.1204 –2.7457 0.0071 –0.3167 0.2288 –1.3844 0.1692
Colombia –0.3309 0.1203 –2.7494 0.007 –0.3173 0.2286 –1.3879 0.1681
Comoros –0.4526 0.1131 –4.0009 0.0001 –0.6571 0.1963 –3.3464 0.0011
Congo, Dem. Rep. –0.3388 0.1173 –2.8889 0.0047 –0.3395 0.2225 –1.5259 0.1301
Congo, Rep. –0.3383 0.1175 –2.88 0.0048 –0.338 0.2229 –1.5169 0.1323
Costa Rica –0.332 0.1199 –2.7693 0.0067 –0.3204 0.2277 –1.4073 0.1623
Côte d’Ivoire –0.3773 0.107 –3.5261 0.0006 –0.447 0.1995 –2.2401 0.0272
Croatia –0.3318 0.1199 –2.7665 0.0067 –0.32 0.2278 –1.4046 0.1631
Dominica –0.4091 0.1052 –3.8872 0.0002 –0.5357 0.1909 –2.8065 0.006
Dominican Republic –0.4485 0.1119 –4.0075 0.0001 –0.6456 0.195 –3.3109 0.0013
Ecuador –0.3402 0.1168 –2.9133 0.0044 –0.3433 0.2214 –1.5504 0.1241
Egypt, Arab Rep. –0.3361 0.1183 –2.841 0.0054 –0.3318 0.2245 –1.478 0.1424
(Continues)
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TABLE A5.4 Elasticity of under-ﬁve mortality and maternal mortality for 
government health expenditures (continued)
Under-ﬁve Standard Maternal Standard
mortality error t-value p-value mortality error t-value p-value
El Salvador –0.3854 0.1059 –3.6379 0.0004 –0.4696 0.1964 –2.3914 0.0186
Equatorial Guinea –1.0837 0.5729 –1.8915 0.0613 –2.4185 0.9728 –2.4861 0.0145
Eritrea –0.3885 0.1057 –3.6769 0.0004 –0.4781 0.1953 –2.4477 0.0161
Estonia –0.3361 0.1183 –2.8415 0.0054 –0.3319 0.2245 –1.4785 0.1423
Ethiopia –0.3623 0.11 –3.2927 0.0014 –0.4051 0.207 –1.9567 0.0531
Gabon –0.3877 0.1057 –3.6669 0.0004 –0.4759 0.1956 –2.4331 0.0167
Gambia, The –0.3572 0.1114 –3.2072 0.0018 –0.3908 0.21 –1.8604 0.0657
Georgia –0.3547 0.1121 –3.1648 0.002 –0.3838 0.2116 –1.8138 0.0726
Ghana –0.425 0.1068 –3.9795 0.0001 –0.5801 0.1905 –3.0444 0.003
Grenada –0.3591 0.1109 –3.2395 0.0016 –0.3961 0.2089 –1.8964 0.0607
Guatemala –0.3961 0.1052 –3.7657 0.0003 –0.4993 0.1932 –2.5849 0.0111
Guinea –0.3803 0.1066 –3.5688 0.0005 –0.4554 0.1983 –2.2964 0.0237
Guinea-Bissau –0.5249 0.1462 –3.5905 0.0005 –0.8589 0.2436 –3.5263 0.0006
Guyana –0.33 0.1207 –2.734 0.0074 –0.3148 0.2293 –1.373 0.1727
Haiti –0.4115 0.1054 –3.9053 0.0002 –0.5425 0.1907 –2.8453 0.0053
Honduras –0.3703 0.1083 –3.4206 0.0009 –0.4274 0.2028 –2.1076 0.0375
Hungary –0.3329 0.1195 –2.7857 0.0063 –0.3231 0.227 –1.4234 0.1576
Iceland –0.33 0.1207 –2.734 0.0074 –0.3148 0.2293 –1.373 0.1727
India –0.3352 0.1186 –2.8262 0.0056 –0.3295 0.2252 –1.4633 0.1464
Indonesia –0.3386 0.1174 –2.885 0.0048 –0.3388 0.2226 –1.5219 0.1311
Jamaica –0.3317 0.12 –2.7636 0.0068 –0.3195 0.2279 –1.4018 0.1639
Jordan –0.4269 0.1071 –3.9862 0.0001 –0.5853 0.1907 –3.0695 0.0027
Kazakhstan –0.383 0.1062 –3.6058 0.0005 –0.4629 0.1972 –2.3466 0.0208
Kenya –0.3684 0.1087 –3.3902 0.001 –0.422 0.2038 –2.0709 0.0408
Korea, Rep. –0.33 0.1207 –2.734 0.0074 –0.3148 0.2293 –1.373 0.1727
Kyrgyz Republic –0.4729 0.1203 –3.9295 0.0002 –0.7137 0.2054 –3.4739 0.0007
Lebanon –0.3372 0.1179 –2.8602 0.0051 –0.3349 0.2237 –1.4971 0.1374
Lesotho –0.33 0.1207 –2.734 0.0074 –0.3148 0.2293 –1.373 0.1727
Lithuania –0.3308 0.1204 –2.7487 0.0071 –0.3172 0.2286 –1.3873 0.1683
Macedonia, FYR –0.4836 0.1249 –3.8722 0.0002 –0.7435 0.2117 –3.5123 0.0007
Madagascar –0.3574 0.1113 –3.2105 0.0018 –0.3913 0.2099 –1.864 0.0651
Malawi –0.3748 0.1074 –3.4892 0.0007 –0.44 0.2006 –2.1928 0.0306
(Continues)
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TABLE A5.4 Elasticity of under-ﬁve mortality and maternal mortality for 
government health expenditures (continued)
Under-ﬁve Standard Maternal Standard
mortality error t-value p-value mortality error t-value p-value
Malaysia –0.33 0.1207 –2.7343 0.0074 –0.3149 0.2293 –1.3732 0.1726
Mali –0.3402 0.1168 –2.9137 0.0044 –0.3434 0.2214 –1.5507 0.124
Mauritania –0.4167 0.1058 –3.9388 0.0001 –0.5568 0.1904 –2.9246 0.0042
Mauritius –0.3331 0.1195 –2.7881 0.0063 –0.3234 0.2268 –1.4257 0.1569
Mexico –0.3301 0.1206 –2.736 0.0073 –0.3151 0.2292 –1.3749 0.1721
Moldova –0.3457 0.1149 –3.0096 0.0033 –0.3587 0.2175 –1.6489 0.1022
Mongolia –0.3722 0.1079 –3.4497 0.0008 –0.4327 0.2019 –2.1434 0.0344
Morocco –0.3354 0.1185 –2.8295 0.0056 –0.33 0.225 –1.4666 0.1455
Mozambique –0.3914 0.1054 –3.7129 0.0003 –0.4864 0.1944 –2.5016 0.0139
Namibia –0.5531 0.1632 –3.3882 0.001 –0.9376 0.2707 –3.464 0.0008
Nepal –0.3384 0.1174 –2.8826 0.0048 –0.3385 0.2227 –1.5195 0.1317
Nicaragua –0.3776 0.107 –3.5305 0.0006 –0.4478 0.1994 –2.2458 0.0268
Niger –0.3569 0.1114 –3.2031 0.0018 –0.3901 0.2102 –1.8559 0.0663
Nigeria –0.3306 0.1204 –2.7449 0.0071 –0.3165 0.2288 –1.3835 0.1695
Pakistan –0.3325 0.1197 –2.7785 0.0065 –0.3219 0.2273 –1.4164 0.1597
Panama –0.3322 0.1198 –2.7733 0.0066 –0.3211 0.2275 –1.4112 0.1612
Paraguay –0.4544 0.1137 –3.9971 0.0001 –0.662 0.197 –3.3608 0.0011
Peru –0.3701 0.1083 –3.418 0.0009 –0.4269 0.2029 –2.1044 0.0378
Philippines –0.3519 0.1129 –3.118 0.0024 –0.3761 0.2133 –1.7632 0.0808
Romania –0.3316 0.12 –2.7625 0.0068 –0.3194 0.228 –1.4008 0.1643
Russian Federation –0.3354 0.1186 –2.8283 0.0056 –0.3298 0.2251 –1.4654 0.1458
Rwanda –0.452 0.1129 –4.002 0.0001 –0.6555 0.1961 –3.3417 0.0012
Senegal –0.4533 0.1133 –3.9995 0.0001 –0.659 0.1966 –3.3519 0.0011
Sierra Leone –0.361 0.1104 –3.2706 0.0015 –0.4013 0.2078 –1.9315 0.0561
Singapore –0.3301 0.1206 –2.7365 0.0073 –0.3152 0.2292 –1.3755 0.1719
South Africa –0.3465 0.1146 –3.0229 0.0032 –0.3608 0.217 –1.6628 0.0994
Sri Lanka –0.3341 0.1191 –2.8064 0.006 –0.3263 0.226 –1.4437 0.1518
St. Kitts and Nevis –0.3521 0.1128 –3.1206 0.0023 –0.3766 0.2132 –1.766 0.0803
St. Lucia –0.3616 0.1102 –3.2816 0.0014 –0.4032 0.2074 –1.944 0.0546
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines –0.3365 0.1181 –2.8479 0.0053 –0.3329 0.2242 –1.4848 0.1406
Sudan –0.3461 0.1147 –3.0172 0.0032 –0.3599 0.2172 –1.6569 0.1006
(Continues)
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That donor funding marginally increases the elasticity of maternal mortality with
respect to government expenditures but not of under-ﬁve mortality is puzzling,
especially because donor funding does not seem to have any direct impact on
maternal mortality.
Endnotes
1. Asymmetry in budgeting refers to the difﬁculties that governments face in cutting
expenditures when resources are declining.
2. A model developed for this book makes several adjustments to the Filmer-Pritchett
and Wagstaff-Claeson models. Annex 5.1 provides a detailed technical explanation of the
model. The model makes four econometric adjustments. First, both government health
expenditures and income are treated as endogenous variables. This allows for a circular
relationship between heath outcomes and income (heath outcomes may improve as
income increases, but improved outcomes may also lead to increased income) and between
government health expenditures and outcomes (for example, larger expenditures may lead
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TABLE A5.4 Elasticity of under-ﬁve mortality and maternal mortality for 
government health expenditures (continued)
Under-ﬁve Standard Maternal Standard
mortality error t-value p-value mortality error t-value p-value
Swaziland –0.33 0.1207 –2.7347 0.0073 –0.3149 0.2293 –1.3736 0.1725
Tajikistan –0.3406 0.1166 –2.9206 0.0043 –0.3445 0.2211 –1.5577 0.1223
Tanzania –0.3675 0.1088 –3.3771 0.001 –0.4197 0.2042 –2.0552 0.0424
Thailand –0.3302 0.1206 –2.7375 0.0073 –0.3154 0.2291 –1.3764 0.1717
Togo –0.3835 0.1062 –3.6123 0.0005 –0.4642 0.1971 –2.3556 0.0204
Trinidad and Tobago –0.33 0.1207 –2.7347 0.0073 –0.3149 0.2293 –1.3737 0.1725
Tunisia –0.3333 0.1194 –2.7919 0.0062 –0.324 0.2267 –1.4295 0.1558
Turkey –0.3301 0.1206 –2.7364 0.0073 –0.3152 0.2292 –1.3753 0.172
Turkmenistan –0.3412 0.1164 –2.9318 0.0041 –0.3463 0.2207 –1.5691 0.1197
Uganda –0.4131 0.1055 –3.9163 0.0002 –0.5469 0.1905 –2.8702 0.005
Ukraine –0.3438 0.1155 –2.9774 0.0036 –0.3535 0.2188 –1.6157 0.1092
Uruguay –0.3319 0.1199 –2.7671 0.0067 –0.3201 0.2278 –1.4052 0.1629
Uzbekistan –0.3438 0.1155 –2.9772 0.0036 –0.3535 0.2188 –1.6155 0.1092
Venezuela, RB –0.3302 0.1206 –2.7386 0.0073 –0.3156 0.2291 –1.3775 0.1713
Vietnam –0.3735 0.1077 –3.4692 0.0008 –0.4363 0.2013 –2.1676 0.0325
Yemen, Rep. –0.3325 0.1197 –2.7776 0.0065 –0.3218 0.2273 –1.4155 0.1599
Zambia –0.3506 0.1133 –3.0949 0.0025 –0.3724 0.2142 –1.7386 0.0851
Zimbabwe –0.3979 0.1051 –3.7849 0.0003 –0.5044 0.1928 –2.6167 0.0102
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to improved outcomes, but the government may increase expenditures when outcomes are
poor). Second, donor funding variables are lagged to account for the fact that commit-
ments are disbursed at a later date but also solve endogeneity of donor funding. Third,
endogeneity and choice of instruments were tested using Staiger and Stock (1997) weak
instrument tests and Hausman (1978) tests. Fourth, the presence of heteroscedasticity was
tested for and corrected (using a general method of moments heteroscedastic two-stage
least squares estimator).
3. As in other studies (Filmer and Pritchett 1999; Wagstaff 2002b; Wagstaff and Claeson
2004), the model did not include private expenditures as part of the explanatory variables.
Filmer and Pritchett (1999) explained that their main reason for not estimating health sta-
tus as a function of private expenditures on health is that private expenditures are inﬂu-
enced rather than determined by policy. Economic agents spend out of pocket when a
health event has taken place; thus, health expenditures and the dependent variables are
endogenous and very hard to separate. In any event, the absence of private health expendi-
tures as an explanatory variable could lead to omitted variable bias. Therefore, private
expenditures were included in the model and shown not to be statistically signiﬁcant. Their
inclusion did not generate a signiﬁcant change in other coefﬁcients. Therefore, private
expenditures were dropped from the model for comparative purposes with other models.
4. There are two related issues with the donor funding variable. First is the double
counting of donor funding. Grants and loans provided by various donor agencies (such as
the World Bank and the United Nations) are given directly to the government for health
and other purposes, and hence are already counted in the government health expenditures
variable. Information on donor funding that is actually available to various countries from
all sources and that is reported “on budget” is not readily available. Information was used
from the OECD/DAC for speciﬁc health projects that are off-budget. But this measure
raises a second issue: the variable captures the amount of the donation receiving countries
were promised by the DAC countries in the given calendar year, not the actual amount
received in donations. The amount received can lag by a few years and even then may differ
from the amount promised. For this reason, the lagged value of the variable was used. For
example, for the analysis for 2000, the donor funding variable is per capita donor funding
from DAC countries for health promised in 1998 (in 2000 Int$).
5. A small change in government health expenditures (Gh) will be associated with a
direct effect and an indirect effect. The direct effect is the marginal impact that a change in
government expenditures may have on under-ﬁve mortality or maternal mortality. How-
ever, governments may use their resources to inﬂuence other Millennium Development
Goal indicators, such as nutrition, which may have an impact on under-ﬁve mortality; this
is the indirect effect. Put another way, the coefﬁcient on Gh represents the percentage
change in the indicators under-ﬁve mortality or maternal mortality ratio associated with a
1 percent change in Gh, holding income (I), education (E), roads (R), sanitation (S), and
donor funding (DF) constant but not the other Millennium Development Goal indicators.
The coefﬁcients in the table, therefore, provide the net impact of changes in the indepen-
dent variables on the under-ﬁve mortality rate and maternal mortality ratio. For ease of
exposition, this net impact of changes is called the net elasticity impact or just elasticity.
6. The under-ﬁve mortality rate is measured as deaths of children under the age of ﬁve
years per 1,000 live births. The maternal mortality ratio is measured as a ratio of maternal
deaths per 100,000 live births. The measure of income is GDP per capita in constant 2000
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international dollars, education is the percentage of the population age 15 or older who are
illiterate, sanitation is the percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation
facilities, and roads are measured as paved roads (in kilometers) per unit area of country
(in square kilometers). Donor funding refers to commitments made by donors with a two-
year lag to ﬁnance health activities outside the government’s budget. Volatility is the stan-
dard deviation of the per capita donor commitments from 1994 to 1998.
7. All currency measurements were converted to constant 2000 international dollars.
8. The results are robust to other measures of volatility of donor funding.
9. The coefﬁcients in the table are not elasticities in the strict economic sense, but rather
some sort of “net elasticities.” It is not possible to separate the direct and indirect effects
because the direct partial elasticity coefﬁcients are not identiﬁed in the estimation model
used. Thus, whenever the term “elasticity” of an outcome indicator with respect to a covari-
ate is used, it refers to the net elasticity. Also, to estimate the elasticity of government health
expenditures on under-ﬁve mortality and maternal mortality, the impact of donor funding
on government health expenditures must also be taken into account (the interaction term).
Thus, to estimate the impact of government health expenditures on under-ﬁve mortality or
maternal mortality, some aggregation of coefﬁcients is necessary. The interpretation of the
government health expenditures coefﬁcients in the table as elasticities is still correct for the
average elasticity across countries (see annex 5.1 for details). Wagstaff and Claeson (2004)
reported the elasticity for under-ﬁve mortality with respect to per capita income in the
range of –0.3 percent to –0.5 percent, while Filmer and Pritchett (1999) had an estimate of
–0.6 percent. Their studies treated Gh as endogenous but not GDP. The estimates across
countries are presented in annex 5.1.
From an econometric perspective the S variable (sanitation) appears to be measured
with error and hence the lack of signiﬁcance may be due to attenuation bias rather than
anything else. Two options for checking this hypothesis are to use a different measure of
this variable (preferably from some other source) or to ﬁnd some instruments for this vari-
able. Currently, the data available fall short on both accounts, and so link between the lack
of signiﬁcance and attenuation bias was not tested.
10. The analysis and results are similar to Wagstaff and Claeson (2004) and ﬁgures 5.1
and 5.2 mirror their analysis. Differences arise largely as a result of the signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cient of the impact of government health expenditures on outcomes in the model here and
the presence of donor funding.
11. The average rate of decline needed between 1990 and 2015 to reach the under-ﬁve
mortality goal across all regions is 4.2 percent. However, given the slow progress from 1990
to 2000, the rate of decline needs to be larger from 2000 to 2015 and larger in some regions
than in others.
12. This annex is based on the working paper “Government Health Expenditures,
Donor Funding, and Health Outcomes” (2005) by Bokhari, Gottret, and Gai. For a copy of
the working paper send an email to fbokhari@fsu.edu.
13. All currency measurements were converted to constant 2000 international dollars.
14. The four broad areas are economic management, structural policies, policies for
social inclusion and equity, and public sector management.
15. There are three such tests for each indicator equation. Thus, the test statistics can be
constructed by comparing: (1) coefﬁcients under assumption (a) where no variable is exoge-
nous to those under (b) where only government health expenditures (and their interaction)
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are endogenous; (2) coefﬁcients under assumption (a) where no variable is exogenous to
those under (c) where income and government health expenditures (and their interaction)
are endogenous; and (3) coefﬁcients under assumption (b) where only government health
expenditures (and their interaction) are endogenous to those under (c) where income and
government health expenditures (and their interaction) are endogenous. Note that the third
test statistic is an incremental test. It tests whether, given that government health expendi-
tures (and their interaction with DF) are endogenous, income is endogenous.
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